

Comments about the Penn East Pipeline PENNEAST PIPELINE PROJECT RESOURCE  
REPORT 11: RELIABILITY AND SAFETY, FERC Docket No. CP15-\_\_-000 September 2015

Gentlemen/women:

I have read the above referenced document and find that the specific questions raised in my comments have not been satisfactorily answered. Additional questions, concerns and comments have surfaced since the publication of the above mentioned document.

Methane gas, according to the Emergency Response Guidebook (2012) is “extremely flammable”, will “form explosive mixtures with air” (despite Penn East’s claim that “unconfined mixtures of methane in air are not generally explosive”) and “will be easily ignited by heat, sparks or flames”. As the fumes are dispersed and taken by the wind, a spark along the path of the fumes can create ignition with a flash back to the source of the methane. “Fire may produce irritating and/or toxic gases” (Emergency Response Guidebook, 2012). Additionally, “vapors may cause dizziness or asphyxiation without warning” (Emergency Response Guidebook, 2012).

## **11.2 Hazards**

### 11.2.1 Pipeline Safety

Pipeline safety is of outmost concern for the EMS sector to prevent accidents that would require EMS interventions. The specific questions from the first paper that I cannot find a specific answer to include whether or not our rescue vehicles (both first aide and fire) would be able to drive over or park on top of the pipeline without causing damage or concern for the pipeline integrity. Additionally would we be able to land a helicopter on the site? As Penn East has sited, that the highest percentage of pipeline incidents are related to damage from external sources. We do not want to be a party to this and request a specific answer to our questions. The

number of all cause incidents is on the rise despite what Penn East would have you believe from their documentation. See chart below:

**PHMSA Pipeline Incidents: (1995-2014)**  
**Incident Type: All Reported System Type: ALL State: ALL**

Calendar Year	Number	Fatalities	Injuries	Property Damage As Reported
1995	349	21	64	\$53,427,112
1996	381	53	127	\$114,467,631
1997	346	10	77	\$79,757,922
1998	389	21	81	\$126,851,351
1999	339	22	108	\$130,110,339
2000	380	38	81	\$191,822,840
2001	341	7	61	\$63,092,462
2002	642	12	49	\$102,167,588
2003	672	12	71	\$139,057,814
2004	671	23	60	\$267,836,502
2005	719	17	47	\$1,245,463,189
2006	639	21	36	\$151,983,767
2007	613	16	49	\$154,533,794
2008	659	8	56	\$565,519,340
2009	628	13	64	\$179,070,183
2010	588	22	108	\$1,509,635,198
2011	594	14	56	\$426,819,470
2012	572	12	57	\$228,447,641
2013	620	10	47	\$347,329,243
2014	702	19	96	\$308,950,827
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>10,844</b>	<b>371</b>	<b>1,395</b>	<b>\$6,386,344,213</b>

Retrieved from PHMSA: USDOT <http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/library/data-stats/pipelineincidenttrends> on October 20, 2015.

The proposed route is partially under power lines that run through Kingwood Township. What if any sections of Kingwood this services is unanswered. Despite the answer, whom ever is serviced by those power lines would lose power should there be an incident in the pipeline that runs below it. This could mean that EMS facilities that rely on electricity to recharge their ambulances and various equipment may have reduced capacity to respond and provide services

needed in an emergency. Homes along the path of that service line would be without power. If life sustaining equipment is utilized, those individuals would be at risk for life threatening events.

New research is being done on slug flow within natural gas pipelines. “Slug flow is a kind of hazardous gas-liquid two-phase flow pattern encountered in pipelines and wells for natural gas production which may cause the vibration and destruction of the pipelines” (Lin, Liu, Hu & Che, 2013, pp. 253). Depending upon the frequency at which this slug flow moves through the pipeline will determine the amount of damage sustained by the pipeline. I would assume that this slug flow is what Penn East refers to when they talk about removing liquids from the pipe. So, although Penn East states most accidents occur due to outside incidents, we must be aware of internal causes affecting the integrity of the pipeline and protect the public from a breach related to these causes. I do not feel that investigating a pipeline once every 7 years as stated by Penn East is sufficient to protect the public from an incident.

### **11.3 Safety Standards for Pipelines**

#### 11.3.1 USDOT Class Locations

Penn East once again reiterates that they will “regularly perform visual inspections of the pipeline to identify potential problems. These inspections will be done on foot, by vehicle on the ROW, or by aerial survey.” Refer back to original document for further concerns. Penn East also proclaims there will be 24 hour electronic monitoring of the pressure readings along the pipeline. Fishwick (2011) describes the Dixie Pipeline incident in 2007. All monitoring and testing was within normal limits. In 2007 the pipeline ruptured. It took 17 minutes for the computer

generated system to identify and the gas flow through the pipeline to be shut down. The gas burned for 37 ½ hours after the gas was shut down. Post analysis of the incident revealed “Clarke County Central Dispatch emergency personnel were not sufficiently knowledgeable about the hazards of a large propane release and the actions to take, including warning emergency callers of imminent dangers” (Fishwick, 2011, pp. 23). Here in Kingwood, a fire burning for that long would be a hardship for our limited resources. Additionally, with all the farmland, open space, farm/housing buildings and wind patterns, I would be concerned about sparks igniting additional fires, the respiratory effects of the burning gas on our residents not to mention the potential for burns and carbon monoxide poisoning. From a cost analysis perspective as noted by the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America in their comment paper regarding PHMSA’s Valve Study – ORNUTM-2012/411; “Most of the savings are based on being able to close the main line valves in 8 minutes or 13 minutes, which is far earlier than normal past experience. The savings go to zero as the time interval to the valve closure gets longer. Consequently, without fire fighter intervention, there is no quantifiable benefit in terms of cost avoidance for damage to buildings and personal property attributed to swiftly closing block valves located upstream and downstream from guillotine-type breaks in natural gas pipelines” (INGAA, 2012, pp. 8) They also went on to note that the majority of damage is already done prior to firefighters arrival to the scene unless firefighters are on scene and ready to fight the fire within ten (10) minutes of the incident occurring. In a volunteer, rural community this is not likely at all to happen. Even when firefighting agencies are in close proximity and staffed, they are not capable of being prepared to battle a fire within ten minutes of being toned out. So once again, prevention and monitoring of the pipeline for safety is of paramount importance. Those

guidelines should meet or exceed current standards and be subject to future changes in standards of care as technology advances.

The question also arises regarding the gas being transported. Per 49 CFR § 192 it appears that not all gas lines need to be odorized. This is a concern. Line running through Class 1 and Class 2 communities do not require the additive so that a leak would be identified through smell. As we saw in the Dixie pipeline rupture, with the smell of gas, it took 17 minutes to shut down the flow of gas and the gas burned for 37 ½ hours. What would happen if we couldn't smell the gas? How much gas would there be in the atmosphere. Fires could potentially be started from quite a distance away. We would want assurance that the gas will have the additive so that it can be smelled in the event of a leak on all pipes running through our community and the surrounding communities.

Once again, the issues regarding the difference in regulations monitoring cathodic protection systems has not been addressed sufficiently. Additionally, what if any effect would this low voltage field in the ground have upon humans and/or animals that may come in contact with the pipe and/or surrounding soil?

### 11.3.2 High Consequence Areas

High consequence areas (HCA) “is used to identify specific areas where an inadvertent release from a pipeline could have the most significant adverse consequences” per Penn East Pipeline report referenced above. These areas are regulated by 49 CFR §192 which stipulates the time frame for monitoring of these areas:

Table 1:

Class location of line	Maximum interval between patrols	
	At highway and railroad crossings	At all other places
1, 2	7 1/2 months; but at least twice each calendar year	15 months; but at least once each calendar year.
3	4 1/2 months; but at least four times each calendar year	7 1/2 months; but at least twice each calendar year.
4	4 1/2 months; but at least four times each calendar year	4 1/2 months; but at least four times each calendar year.

Note: 49 CFR §192.705 Retrieved from [http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?SID=d8fca90cc50287e4fcc7162b4c63d2c5&mc=true&node=pt49.3.192&rgn=div5#se49.3.192\\_1903](http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?SID=d8fca90cc50287e4fcc7162b4c63d2c5&mc=true&node=pt49.3.192&rgn=div5#se49.3.192_1903)

Unfortunately, I do not see specified the method of surveillance by the federal government. It appears to be left up to the company. Penn East has admitted the “pipelines will be inspected at intervals specified by USDOT regulations (typically 7 year intervals. . .” Therefore, I ask once again the specifics of monitoring beside computerized pressure monitoring to prevent intrusions into the integrity of the pipeline. I seem a bit confused based on the regulations and Penn East’s admissions. I would rather our EMS services not be needed at all. Prevention is paramount. The Dixie Pipeline was inspected and passed one year prior to the rupture.

In my earlier response I questioned about the potential impact radius (PIR). After additional research and reading Penn East’s most recent resource report dated September 2015 I have gained some insight which has led to more questions. It would appear that with a 36 inch pipe and an operating pressure of 1480 lbs. per square inch gauge that the hazard zone would be between 900- 1100 foot radius from the site of breach (see Table 2).

“People and property damages are included in the definition of PIR basis in §192.903 which defines the potential impact radius as” the radius of a circle within which the potential failure of a pipeline could have significant impact on people or property.” Both people and property are significantly impacted inside the PIR circle. People are estimated to escape but can be exposed to a significant thermal radiation flux causing 3rd degree burns and it models 1% lethality. Property is exposed to a flux in excess of 5,000 BTU/h-ft<sup>2</sup> which is accepted as the thermal flux needed for the piloted ignition of a wood

2x4. Thermal radiation comes from the natural gas fire. Initially the exterior of the spherical cap, burning gas cloud, rising from the ground will ignite all combustible materials within a large diameter. The intense initial radiation flux at the beginning of the gas fire preheats the adjacent surfaces and once they exceed the dosage they are susceptible to piloted ignition (Stephens page 189 table 2.2). This initial gas fire ball also starts a ground fire. The ground fire also ignites the preheated surfaces. Any new thermal flux criterion is unnecessary” (INGAA, 2012, pp. 6)

INGAA went on to talk about how wind and geography can affect the PIR. They also note that there is a small window, 30 seconds, for an individual to get into a building for safety after the breach. The percentage of lethality is based on the assumption that most people would escape. Most people would not make it into their homes in 30 seconds given the rural characteristics of our town. Therefore, there would be a need for EMS services to treat any humans in the PIR. Again, these humans may have 3<sup>rd</sup> degree burns and/or may not be dead and deserve immediate treatment. This would involve a collaborative effort and training for all personal involved. What is the safety zone, what type of protective gear would be necessary at what distances? All these questions and concerns need to be addressed and a plan in place prior to the building of the pipeline.

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


Figure 2.4 Proposed hazard area radius as a function of line diameter and pressure.

from Stephens, M. (2000). *A model for sizing high consequence areas associated with natural gas pipelines*. (pp. 11).

Once again, I refer back my original documentation regarding methane, its effects on vegetation etc. Again, the regulations regarding the addition of Mercaptan to an interstate transmission line seem to indicate that it is not necessary. 49 CFR §192 stipulates which gas lines are required to add Mercaptan and which lines are not. The issue of being below the power lines and the effect of a breach on the power in our town has not specifically been addressed. I am still unclear about the type of fluid that accumulates in natural gas pipelines that requires special disposal. Is this fluid toxic, irritating or harmless? If there is a breach and this liquid is in the pipe, what happens to the liquid? Does it vaporize? Will it cause acute respiratory distress? What about the heavy metals that may be deposited in the soil that our children and farmers will be playing in? These issues were not addressed by Penn East in the safety portion of their resource report.

#### 11.3.2.2 Unusually Sensitive Areas

Kingwood Township is serviced by individual wells for their source of water. Issues regarding contamination from heavy metal fallout from welding, interrupting the water aquifer and having a negative effect on the integrity of surrounding wells. This all could result in contamination of household drinking water. This would not be recognized until the occupants become ill and the illness is traced back to their drinking water. What measures are being taken to mitigate these negative and potentially unhealthy consequences?

#### 11.3.4 Mainline Valves

Refer to analysis of Dixie Pipeline incident of 2007. It took 17 minutes for the valves to be shut down and the gas burned for 37 ½ hours. What is the anticipated time frame for shut down of valves and how long will it take for the gas to burn out? The longer the burn the more resources are necessary and the risk for collateral damage increases. Post analysis of the Edison Pipeline explosion noted the lack of enough appropriate equipment and water to prevent the spread of fire. Kingwood has a lot of agricultural land actively engaged in farming. Additionally, many homes on large parcels do not water their lawns, out of respect to the limited water supply, and may have dry brown lawns during the summer months. Unlike Edison, which has a lot of pavement and structures, we have a lot of grass, trees and brush. All of which ignite very easily when there is a dry spell. INGAA (2012) notes that if the firefighters cannot be ready to battle a fire within 10 minutes, the majority of the damage will have already occurred. They also note that PIR does not take into consideration prevailing winds, land topography and other factors that may increase the PIR. Since this pipeline will be placed within one mile of our elementary school, have these mitigating factors been addressed? Specifically, how close will the pipeline be to our elementary school?

### 11.7 Integrity Management Program

Penn East proposes a 7 year interval for pipeline inspections. According to the USDOT:

**“§192.706 Transmission lines: Leakage surveys.** Leakage surveys of a transmission line must be conducted at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year. However, in the case of a transmission line which transports gas in conformity with §192.625 without an odor or odorant, leakage surveys using leak detector equipment must be conducted—

- (a) In Class 3 locations, at intervals not exceeding 7½ months, but at least twice each calendar year; and

(b) In Class 4 locations, at intervals not exceeding 4½ months, but at least four times each calendar year.

[Amdt. 192-21, 40 FR 20283, May 9, 1975, as amended by Amdt. 192-43, 47 FR 46851, Oct. 21, 1982; Amdt. 192-71, 59 FR 6585, Feb. 11, 1994]” (USDOT, 2015)

Penn East has based their report on references from 1993 and 1999. Since that time much research has been done on pipelines, pipeline safety and hazards. More research is still needed to understand the full scope of potential dangers. Again, I request the questions in this comment and the prior comment be addressed with up to date information.

Respectfully submitted,

Nancy Ponter

Chief, Kingwood Rescue Squad

#### References

Fishwick, T. (2011). A major release and ignition of propane from a ruptured pipeline. *Loss Prevention Bulletin*, (220), 19-24

Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA). (2012). *Comments from the Interstate Natural Gas Association of American on Draft Research Report*. Retrieved from Interstate Natural Gas Association of America: <http://ingaa.org>

Lin, M., Liu, Y., Hu, Y., & Che, D. (2013). Influence of the gas and liquid superficial velocity on slug frequency. *AIP Conference Proceedings*, 1547(1), 253-263. doi:10.1063/1.4816874

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. (2012). *2012 Emergency Response Guidebook*. Washington DC: US Department of Transportation.

Stephens, M. (2000). *A model for sizing high consequence areas associated with natural gas pipelines*. Alberta Canada: Gas Research Institute.

USDOT. (2015). 49 CFR 192, Transportation of natural and other gases by pipeline. *Minimum Federal Safety Standards*. Retrieved from [http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?SID=d8fca90cc50287e4fcc7162b4c63d2c5&mc=true&node=pt49.3.192&rgn=div5#se49.3.192\\_1903](http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?SID=d8fca90cc50287e4fcc7162b4c63d2c5&mc=true&node=pt49.3.192&rgn=div5#se49.3.192_1903)

Concerns about the PennEast Pipeline and comments re: PENNEAST PIPELINE  
PROJECT RESOURCE REPORT11: Reliability and Safety. FERC Docket No.PF15-1-000

Sir/Madam:

Section 11.2.1 Pipeline Safety:

“The highest percentage of transmission pipeline accidents or incidents is the result of damage caused by external forces (USDOT, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration). These external forces include third-party damage from construction equipment, earth movements (e.g. landslides), weather damage, or deliberate damage. PennEast will conduct thorough monitoring and inspections of its pipeline system for leak detection”

I understand that pipeline inspections for leaks will be performed. My understanding is that this will be done with robotics from the inside. Since the majority of incidents are the result of “external forces” how do they plan to monitor for these circumstances. We get severe storms with run-off and soil erosion, we have a high water table in most areas that could apply pressure on the pipe. What is meant by construction equipment causing harm? Does this mean that our rescue vehicles (both first aid and fire) are too heavy to drive over these pipelines thereby limiting our most direct access to a potentially critical patient? This may limit our access to a scene, especially when there are other obstacles in the way. What about landing a helicopter over a pipe?

Additionally, unlike Buckeye who has a booklet on what can and cannot be done within a given parameter of the pipeline, PennEast stated at one of their meetings for landowners who could potentially see the pipeline on their properties that the only restriction would be not to build on the pipeline or easement. This lends me to believe that safety is not one of their primary

goals in building this pipeline. Is there not a potential to disrupt the integrity of the pipeline through vibrations in the ground? What about building a pond next to the easement? What about rerouting the flow of water through the property? Would that effect the pipeline and how it sits in the earth?

Should there be no such restrictions near and around the pipeline I fear there would be an increase in incidents by external forces necessitating the services of the rescue squad and fire departments. Additionally, since the pipeline follows the route of some of the power lines, if there were a breach and a plume of fire what would this do to the power lines? What area does the power lines service? Our building does not have its own generator and therefore our ambulances would not be charged and ready to respond if we lose power. What about our citizens that use home oxygen and rely on the electricity to run their units? If they lose power there would be an influx of people needing EMS services for transportation to the hospital where they would be provided with their much needed oxygen. This would stress the services of the EMS community along with the hospital.

#### 11.3.1 USDOT Class Locations

“External corrosion protection will be achieved by means of externally coated pipe and cathodic protection using rectifiers and anodes as required by 49 CFR Part 192. The cathodic protection systems will impress a low-voltage current to the pipeline to offset natural soil and groundwater corrosion potential.” According the US EPA website regarding cathodic protection systems for underground storage tanks “The system must be tested by a qualified cathodic protection tester within six months of installation and at least every three years thereafter. In addition, cathodic protection systems must be tested within six months of any repair to any cathodically protected UST system. You will need to keep the results of the last two tests to

prove that the cathodic protection is working. In addition, you must inspect an impressed current system every 60 days to verify that the system is operating. Keep results of your last three 60-day inspections to prove that the impressed current system is on and operating properly.” So if we are that strict on underground storage units would we not be as strict on the pipeline to make sure the integrity of the cathodic protection system is intact? Although they mention that the design will “allow for the use of electronic in-line inspection tools to detect the presence of metal loss defects, such as corrosion ...” the frequency and protocol is not spelled out. It just mentions that an electronic in-line inspection tool CAN be used.

One would also assume that this low voltage field in the ground would not be a danger to animals or humans. Since electricity does flow nicely in water, if someone walking through a very soggy field with the pipeline buried 30 inches in normal soil or 18 inches in consolidated rock be at risk? What if they had a pacemaker?

Visual inspections to identify potential problems is a safety feature. “Leak protection and detection is important to public safety. PennEast operating personnel will regularly perform visual inspections of the pipeline to identify potential problems. These inspections will be done on foot, by vehicle on the ROW, or by aerial survey.” Unfortunately, the word ‘or’ in this sentence means that all inspections can be done from the air. In an open field, this may be acceptable but when there are trees and brush an adequate visual inspection would be impossible from the air. Their language allows that aerial survey can be the only means of visual inspection of the pipeline. I feel this is inadequate. Additionally, how often will the pipeline be inspected? “[I]he pipelines will be inspected at intervals specified by USDOT regulations (typically 7 year intervals) within-line inspection tools capable of detecting anomalies that have the potential to

become leaks.” Refer to comments about the cathodic protection systems above. How often other means of inspection will be done is not specified in this document.

### 11.3.2 High Consequence Area

This section talks about the potential impact radius. Is the potential impact radius from this pipeline 660 feet as it seems to indicate in this document? That’s radius not diameter. If this is the case, then we need to rethink our concerns and how we may need to proceed to protect our community. Section 11.5 Contingency Plans is very broad and generic. Basically they will provide a means to communicate with the company during an incident. We are not trained nor do we have the resources to deal with an explosion similar to what occurred in Edison, New Jersey. We would need training and the appropriate equipment to deal with such incidents should the pipeline go in and any incidents associated with the installation of the pipeline. This training would need to be ongoing with drills to keep the skills that we hope we would never have to use. This training would include but not be limited to mass casualty incidents involving a breach in the integrity of the pipeline to trench rescue training.

After reading through the document provided, the above are my questions and concerns as they relate to said document. I would also request the following information be provided so that we may further evaluate the situation. Should there be a leak and it catches fire, what temperatures will it produce and how far out will temperatures be above 100 degrees F from the breach site? How long does vegetation need to be exposed to methane gas before their foliage turns? And how much methane needs to be leaking to cause this to happen? It is my

understanding that interstate pipelines are not required to add Mercaptan. This is the chemical that gives the gas that rotten egg smell. If this is the case, then small leaks can go undetected for up to 7 years or until someone lights a match or a spark ignites that gas. What if there is an electrical outage and the automatic shut off valves are not working? How long will it take for someone to get here and manually close the valves? Can the valves be manually closed by one person? Does that one person need to be very strong or just have endurance? How long would it take to manually close a valve?

We already have underground utilities throughout Hunterdon County, specifically Kingwood Township. How would this pipeline impact those underground utilities and other pipelines? If we are only inspecting the pipelines for potential leaks every 7 years, and one pipeline has a small leak and another blows, what will be the consequences? Are the pipelines that close that it will have an impact or could have an impact? If the area of intense heat projects out to another pipeline what will be the consequences? Up to what heat can the pipeline maintain its integrity? What if there is a house fire or brush fire on top or close by the pipeline? Will it affect the pipeline and thereby dictate where EMS should not stage? Or worse, a potential increase in victims of the incident.

After reading their safety information on line, once again the intervals between “pigging” the line is not specified. This is the stated process for cleaning and examining the pipeline. Interesting that they mention that the pig will collect fluid from the line and it will be disposed of in the proper fashion according to governmental regulations. What is this fluid? Is it harmful to animals and humans? How does it interact with the cathodic protection system around the pipe should there be a small leak? I assume when there is a breach in the integrity of the pipe, gas will flow to the area of least resistance, the breach, and escape. That being said, will the fluid that

accumulated in the pipeline also act the same way? Is that fluid harmful when aerosolized or burned?

Further research into this proposition has led to some other questions and concerns. These concerns have to do more with the installation of the pipeline. The obvious concerns have to do with trench rescues. We are not trained nor do we have the equipment to perform such a rescue. An emergency call to the site may pose a danger to the EMS community responding not being familiar with the special circumstances along with a delay in treatment should a specialized team need to be called in.

Secondly, my research indicates that during the installation of the pipeline there is a danger of heavy metal poisoning. According to Shi, P., Xiao, J., Wang, Y., & Chen, L. (2014). Assessment of Ecological and Human Health Risks of Heavy Metal Contamination in Agriculture Soils Disturbed by Pipeline Construction. *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health*, 11(3), 2504–2520. <http://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph110302504>,

“Children may absorb much more heavy metals from soils than adults during their outdoor play activities, resulting in more susceptibility for children to exposure to soil toxic metals [33]. Therefore, pipeline RoW [right of way] was a high health hazard risk zone and children were more susceptible to non-carcinogenic hazard risks. The human health risk assessment is an effective approach to provide a quantitative determination for future risk management and environmental monitoring of pipeline construction” (pp. 2515).

Copper and Cadmium were the two significant heavy metals found in the right of way of the pipeline. Cadmium is noted to be a by-product of welding. Cadmium can be a carcinogenic. It is implicated in lung cancer when inhaled. According to the US Department of Labor, OSHA website regarding cadmium, most studies included adults and animals exposed to inhaled cadmium. Inhaled cadmium can cause a pneumonitis within 10-14 hours after exposure in adults.

Since cadmium is associated with welding and the proposed pipeline will be near Kingwood Elementary School, I would be concerned for the safety of our children. I could not find documentation regarding cadmium toxicity and children. OSHA does acknowledge that cadmium can be absorbed through the skin. Therefore, it would be a concern for cadmium in the soil in areas where children might play. This concern would need to be further investigated with an expert in the field of toxicology.

I have reviewed the lessons learned from the Edison NJ incident in 1994. What is applicable to our EMS community is that we are not equipped to monitor and provide rehab services to the large number of firefighters that may be required for an incident. Additionally, if it is a large scale incident, we will stress the available EMS resources within the county. Automated monitoring equipment would help to alleviate some of these issues. Along with additional type of monitoring equipment to ensure the safety of our firefighters. Also, communication issues, especially in Kingwood Township, would need to be address. Radio signals in certain areas of the township are nonexistent, both for cell phone and portable radio communication.

I would be more than happy to discuss my concerns with you. I am sure as time goes on, as additional information is provided, it will stimulate further questions and concerns.

Sincerely,

Nancy Ponter

Chief, Kingwood Township First Aid & Rescue Squad